This article presents a theoretical model to explain the performance of illicit drug markets. The analytical framework is based on the oligopoly model of Poret and Téjedo (2006), but the latter is extended in a crucial respect: the influence of drug trafficking networks in the illicit drug markets is considered. The proposed model indicates that Poret and Téjedo were correct: the aggregate quantity of drugs sold is negatively affected by the intensity of the law enforcement policies applied and positively affected by the number of traffickers in the market. We also determined that the individual and aggregate sales in the market are positively affected by the network’s average density. Our model is useful for explaining the failure of the war against drugs to halt the reproduction and expansion of illegal activities at a global level during the three past decades.

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  • Autor(es): Esta dirección de correo electrónico está siendo protegida contra los robots de spam. Necesita tener JavaScript habilitado para poder verlo.
  • Fecha: 2015-05-01
  • Palabras Clave: drug trafficking, illegal markets, law enforcement, social networks, gametheory, oligopoly
  • Nota: Documento de Trabajo No. 162. Mayo 2015
  • Código Jel: K42, D43, L13, C72, D85
  • Número de páginas: 2-29
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